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LAW AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY RENAISSANCE VENICE
GUIDO RUGGIERO*
Fourteenth-century Venice was an unusual city,
perhaps the wealthiest in Western Europe. It had
a trading empire whose domain stretched from the
Near East to the Atlantic. Individual entrepreneurs
had even reached as far as China and in the process
the merchant elite of Venice, who were legally
recognized as nobles, had become collectively and
individually some of the richest men in Europe. A
balanced trade provided the main economic mea-
sure of their wealth; balanced, that is, between the
long-distance trade of spices and other luxury prod-
ucts of the East and a short-distance trade in staples
carried out over the extensive inland waterways of
the Lombard plain. But Venice was unusual in
more than its wealth. Politically, its merchant no-
bility-which formally took absolute control of
government in the fourteenth century by enacting
laws that allowed no one but members of their
legally defined class to hold office-attempted to
rule Venice through a particularly rationalized and
unified bureaucracy. While much of the rest of
Europe was still under the rule of the households
of hereditary kings or local nobles, Venice lived
and traded under a rule of written law interpreted
by elected councils and judges and enforced by an
elaborate bureaucracy.
For a merchant elite the social defense system
was especially important for protecting the monop-
oly of power and for providing a climate of peace
and stability essential for trade. In the fourteenth
century this system was considerably enlarged and
strengthened with police patrols eventually reach-
ing a proportion of one patroller to every 250
inhabitants. At the same time, much of thejudicial
system was streamlined and rationalized. This
complex process has been discussed elsewhere.' In
this article I wish to concentrate on another aspect
of the social defense system-its approach to pen-
ology.
Generally both historians and criminologists
who have studied the development of penology
* Assistant Professor of History, University of Cincin-
nati.
S'See G. MARANINI, LA COSTr'rUZON- DI V-NEZIA
Ix)o L.A SIRRATA IFtL MAGGIOR CONSIGI.EO (1931). My
forthcoming book entitled "Violence and Perception in
Early Renaissance Venice," will also discuss these devel-
opments in detail.
have been hampered because they have relied too
heavily on the law as an accurate reflection of
actual practice. The principal problem with this
approach is the fact that law is an extremely
conservative institution. It often represents value
systems that have long fallen out of use, and which
remain only as "window dressing" for current prac-
tice. The historian who places too much faith in
law may be describing an impractical pastische of
the good intentions of several centuries, which have
almost no relationship to actual usage.
In the Early Renaissance, custom and law were
so intertwined on a day-to-day basis that it was
virtually impossible to separate them. Contempo-
raries did make progress in distinguishing the two,
at least on the theoretical level, but their major
obstacle in practice was the technological problem
of keeping track of the quantity of legislation being
passed by the growing number of councils having
legislative responsibilities, in the complex govern-
ments of the period.
Fourteenth-century Venice was a good example
of how this technical difficulty presented a problem
in the application of law to society. The core of
Venetian criminal law was codified in the Promis-
sione Maleficorum of the early thirteenth century.
Although this document remained a basic refer-
ence, it was modified only slightly in the next two
centuries, when actual criminal procedure was un-
dergoing significant change. Parti, legislation with
the force of law, were being passed in many coun-
cils ofstate but little attempt was made to integrate
this new law with the old. The sheer mass of this
legislation made it almost impossible to determine
what the actual law of Venice was at any given
time.
2
The nobility was well aware of the confusion
caused by this multiplicity of laws, and attempted
a number of solutions at the end of the thirteenth
century and the beginning of the fourteenth. This
2 On the general problem of just what constituted the
law in late medieval and early renaissance Venice prob-
ably the best introduction is now, L. PANSOI.I.i, LA
GFRARCHIA DEI.- FON'I DI DIRI'IO NEI.A I.IMISIA-
ZION- MEDI-VAI.- VENE-ZIANA (1970). The source for
easiest access to Venetian law remains M. FERRO, Di-
ZIONARIO DEl. DIRI]T'O COMUNE It VENI-TO (2d ed.
1845).
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was a period when the number and powers of
councils were being expanded, so a conciliar solu-
tion was attempted.
A fairly obvious council to tackle the problem
was the Avogaria di Comun as it had traditionally
worked closely with Venetian legal problems. Its
three main members, known as Avogadori and
drawn exclusively from the nobility, were the pri-
mary criminal prosecutors for the state. They pre-
pared, argued and recommended penalties for most
crimes before the main judicial councils of Venice.
Though the name of their office and their function
implied that they were lawyers, they were generally
non-professionals elected by their peers for a term
of two years apparently more for their own or their
families' political and social savvy and significance
than for their.legal acumen. The latter, legal acu-
men, was supplied by a varying number of non-
noble notaries and scribes who tended to have legal
training and to be more permanent functionaries
on the council.3
Essentially, the Avogaria di Comun was given
the responsibility for collating the laws and acting
as a legal reference service for the state. One of the
results of this responsibility was a series of registers
listing the most important legislation passed by the
commune. Capitularies, also, were set up for all the
councils of Venice, but especially for patrolling
bodies and courts. These capitularies were collec-
tions of the laws and working procedures that
applied to a particular council, patrolling body, or
court. Although lacking the force of law, the ca-
pitularies were, along with the recommendations
of the Avogadori and custom, the source of daily
3 One of the most ancient of the Venetian councils, the
Avogaria di Comun was also one of the most complex
and, in criminal matters, powerful centers of authority in
fourteenth-century Venice. Here we can attempt only a
brief summary of its responsibilities. Unlike most of its
counterparts, it had neither judicial nor legislative pow-
ers. But in the evolutionary process of Venetian political
organization, these defects were overcome by a strange
accretion of responsibilities that assured unusual author-
ity both in determining and implementing the law. Cen-
tral to this authority was the responsibility of the Avo-
garia to collect and edit into one series of registers the
major legislation of the commune, noted above. The
council also was supposed to see to it that this legislation
was implemented. For example, the Avogadori sat in on
the central councils of state to verify that those councils
adhered to the rules and procedures previously enacted
and, of course, recorded by the Avogaria. Finally, they
suggested the penalties for infractions against these en-
actments. These powers along with their traditional role
as state prosecutors made the Avogaria di Comun a very
potent office essentially because they controlled and
helped to apply the collective legal memory of the state.
legal practice. However, the capitularies were kept
in an extremely haphazard fashion during the
Early Renaissance, so much so that it is impossible
to reconstruct legal practice on the basis of the
evidence contained in the documents. 4 Even if the
evidence were complete, however, there would be
a further limitation to its use. Instead of referring
to legal precedent, Venetians were content to leave
decisions about penalties for individual crimes al-
most entirely in the hands of the judge or judging
council. For criminal matters, practice tended to
bypass formal written law.
The Promissione Maleficorzmr was an appendix to
the larger and more prescriptive compilation of
civil laws organized by the chief executive officer
of the state, Doge Jacobo Tiepolo, in the early
thirteenth century.5 It began with a short statement
of purpose by Tiepolo: "Since we hold that justice
requires our unceasing vigil and concern in order
to correct excess and punish crime," a studied
compilation of criminal law should, therefore, be
applauded by all.6 Although this introduction was
very short, it gave an interesting perspective on the
function of law in social defense. Tiepolo saw the
responsibility of law in its relationship to correction
and punishment. There was a fatalistic acceptance
of the inevitability of crime in this preamble. "Un-
ceasing vigil" will bring only correction and pun-
ishment, or at best the control to keep crime within
acceptable limits. We find little optimism, or belief
in the capacity of law to decrease the level of
' Existing capitularies, though they report a few im-
portant parti from the fourteenth-century, seem to con-
centrate primarily on texts from the fifteenth and six-
teenth centuries. The main exception to this later ori-
entation is the capitulary for the Signori di Notte. See N.
MOCENIGO, CAPITOLARE DEI SIGNORI DI No'i-rI' ESIS-
TANTE NEL CIVICO MusEo DI VENEZIA (1877). The early
entries of judicial capitularies were edited. See LE MAG.
Is'rRA'rURE GIUDICIARIE VENEZIANE E I LORO CAPITO-
LARE FINO AL 1300, in MONUMENTI SrORICI DALLA R.
DEPUTAZIONE VENETA DI STORIA PxrRIA (M. Roberti
ed. 1907-11) (3 volumes).5 Tiepolo's law code was published. See Gli statuti tene-
ziani di Jacopo Tiepolo del 1232 e e loro glosse, in 30
MEMORIA DEL REALE IsTrruTro VENETrO Dl SCIENZE.
LE I'ERE ED ART (R. Cessi ed. 1938). The Promissione,
however, is not included. It was published, though, in
the eighteenth century. See Liber Promissione Malefici [ca.
12321 in LEGGi CRIMINALI DEL SERENISSIMO DOMINIO
VENErO IN UN SOLO VOLUME RACCOL'rE E PER PUB-
BLICO DECRETO RISTAMPATE (1751).
6 The full text reads: "Gum ex rigore iustitie excessus
emendare et punire malefitia merito invicte nobis sollicitudinis
teneamus. Ad hoc efficiendum tanto studiosius intendere volumus
quanto de vitiorun correctione tota patria laudabiliterpraedicitur."
Marciana, Ms. Lat., Cl. V, 137 (10453), f.78v.
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criminal activity, either through severity or ration-
ality.
The Promissione began with a long section on
robbery. That section, unlike other sections dealing
with violent crimes, included a detailed scheme of
penalties. Its position at the beginning of the crim-
inal code, in addition to the detailed penalties,
indicates that robbery was the crime of greatest
concern to the ruling class which wrote and applied
the law. Moreover, robbery was evaluated by the
Promissione without reference to violence, but rather
on the basis of the quantity of property taken.
Penalties were carefully graded into several levels
of severity, according to the value of the loss. The
scale began with a simple whipping for first offend-
ers who stole less than one lira. However, the scale
rapidly escalated to the loss of an eye for stealing
goods valued from five to ten lire. Hanging was the
penalty for anyone who stole more than forty lire.
For repeaters, however, the law contained no gra-
dations: hanging was the penalty. The law also
dealt in detail with penalties to be imposed for
breaking and entering with the intention to rob, or
for carrying weapons during a robbery.7
Much more brief were the subsequent sections
on assault and murder. Simple assault carried a
fine of twenty-five lire, or the placing of the crim-
inal under a ban of the state. Penalties for assault
that drew blood ("sanguinemfecerit") were left to the
discretion of the judge ("per discretionen iudicum
vidicetur").8 The contrast in the eyes of the law
between robbery and assault was clear. Penalties
for robbery were carefully prescribed, but assault
that drew blood was left to the discretion of the
judging body. This distinction is found throughout
the Promissione. There was judicial discretion in
penalties for violence, but carefully codified pen-
alties for property crimes.
This distinction had several important results.
First, although the Promissione left little leeway to
the judge in robbery cases, punishment for violence
was more likely to include personal factors. Second,
since the law prescribed the penalties for robbery
without reference to violence, considerations of
violence did not enter into the discussion of rob-
beries preserved in the criminal records except in
extreme cases. These records, which served as the
prosecution brief for each case, were much more
concerned with establishing the value of the prop-
erty taken than examining levels of violence. Most
important, however, this judicial discretion for vi-
7 id. at f.78v-79v.8 Id. at f.79v.
olent crimes meant that the penalties, within the
parameters established by law, reflected contem-
porary perceptions of the seriousness of the crime,
rather than a continuing legal tradition.
This was especially true in the Council of Forty,
the main council dealing with violent crime in
Venice.' In the Forty a sizeable group of noble
councilors, virtually all amateurs in legal matters,
acted as both judge and jury for a wide range of
crimes. The Forty's trial procedure was both com-
plex and personal. Briefly the Avogadori as state
prosecutors and the Forty asjudge andjury covered
six steps in a normal trial: (1) accusation; (2)
preparation by the Avogadori of the prosecution's
case-the intromissione; (3) the pleading of the case
by the Avogadori-the placitare; (4) the voting on
guilt or innocence by the Forty with a majority
being normally sufficient for conviction; (5) the
proposal of penalties by the Avogadori and by
individuals or groups within the Forty; (6) voting
the penalty with a majority being necessary for a
penalty to pass. Behind this formal structure of the
trial, however, much room was left by the proce-
dure and the law for these amateur judges (but
professional nobles) to weigh the social and politi-
cal impact of their actions. Thus, within similar
crime categories there existed wide ranges of pen-
alties, based more upon perceptions of violence,
politics or personalities than upon abstract con-
cepts of law and justice.
Homicide followed the same pattern as assault,
with the penalty being left to the discretion of the
judge. However, for homicide further questions of
proof of guilt were raised. If guilt was not securely
established through a confession or testimony, the
matter was left to the conscience of the judge.10
Thus, criminals whose guilt was not clearly estab-
lished might still be punished in accordance with
the judge's perception of the case. "Innocent until
proven guilty" was too limiting a distinction to
apply to Venice's fluid jurisprudence. Once more,
9 The Forty was a legislative and judicial council. As
a legislative body it was primarily concerned with the
internal affairs of the state. For a general survey of the
powers of the Forty see, 1 LE DELIBERAZIONI DEL CON-
SIGLIO DEI XL DELLA REPUBBLICA DI VENEZIA
1342-1344, in 9 DEPLUTAZIONE DI STORIA PATlRIA PER LE
VENEZIE, MONUMENT STORICI (A. Lombardo ed.
1954)(nuova serie).
'0 "[A]nd if the accused did not clearly commit homi-
cide, condemning and punishing him will be left to the
conscience and discretion of the judge." The Latin text
reads "[AJut non fuerit manifestum homicidium ipsum ptrpe-
trasse sit in conscientia el discrelione iudicum de condempnando el
puniendo eum." Marciana, Ms. Lat., Cl. V, 137 (10453),
f.80r.
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the importance of law was negated by the laws
themselves. What really mattered in penology were
the institutions of society and the men who con-
trolled them.
The penalty for rape was clearly spelled out in
the Promissione. Whether the victim was a virgin,
an unmarried woman who was no longer a virgin,
or a married woman, rape had a fixed penalty. If
the culprit confessed or was convicted by testi-
mony, he was to be placed in jail for eight days
until he had paid as a fine the equivalent of the
victim's dowry. This sum was determined by the
judges, thus introducing an element of judicial
leeway. If the criminal could not pay the fine
within eight days, he was to lose both eyes." In the
fourteenth-century records, however, there was not
one case where rape was punished by cutting out
the eyes of the criminal. What little corporal pun-
ishment there was concentrated on beating and
branding. Still, the law of 1232 seemed more defi-
nite for rape than for either assault or murder. But
this apparent specificity was compromised by a
final clause which ruled that if the crime was not
clearly rape, or the proof of guilt insufficient, then
once more the penalty was to be left to the judge's
discretion.' 2 Given the nature of rape, especially in
a male-oriented society, it must be assumed that
judges regularly claimed such authority.
In the 1331 correction of the Promissione, attrib-
uted by some manuscripts to Andrea Dandolo, this
broader latitude was formally granted. The Forty
and the ducal councilors were instructed to judge
rape cases in such a manner that all concerned
were indemnified, including the victim, the state,
and whoever else might have been injured.13 But
as to what these indemnities should be, the law
made no mention, leaving the penalty to the dis-
cretion of the Forty.
Continuing this theme in the last section of the
Promissione, Tiepolo summed up the whole of the
criminal code by stating that it would be impossi-
ble to enumerate every possible crime and posit
penalties for it; instead, for those crimes not cov-
" Id. at f.82r.
12 "If, however, these [rapes] were not clear nor able to
be proved the penalty imposed by thejudge will be at his
discretion .... " "Si veto hec manifesta non fuerint nec
probari poterit in discretione sit iudicur penarn eis talem
imponere .. . " Id.
13 The exact text paraphrased above states "quod
puniatur per ipsa consilia vel maiorem partern eonwn in persona el
in havere tam in satisfaciendo mulieri quam comuni quam eiain
quibuscumque iniuria pertinebitis." Id. at f.83v. An exemplar
of the tradition that names this as part of the Dandolo
correction is a manuscript now preserved in the Querini
Stampalia: Querini, Cl. IV, Cod. 2 H. 7, f.l lr.
ered, the determination was to remain "in the
hands of the judge according to the quality of the
crime."'" Since the code considered only robbery,
assault, murder, and rape in any detail and, ex-
cepting robbery, tended to leave wide latitude to
the judges anyway, it was apparent that the Prom-
issione did not place many limitations on judicial
decisions.
This was typical of the Early Renaissance style
of justice in Venice, which was individualistic and
personal rather than fixed upon an abstract con-
cept of justice embodied in the law. Symbolizing
this attitude there is, among the sculptures on the
capitals of the columns before the Ducal Palace, a
representation of Justice holding the traditional
scales and sword. But the sculpture is unusual
because Justice is presented without a blindfold.
Venetian law removed the blindfold from justice,
by asking the judges to evaluate each case with
their eyes open and while mindful of the character
and condition of both culprit and victim. The law
provided Venetian practice with only the most
general framework. To understand the real Early
Renaissance reaction to criminality, we must turn
to the cases themselves and to the penalties which
were imposed.
Within the process of assigning penalties for
crime, there is constant tension between retribution
and warning, between vengeance and social con-
trol. These elements are difficult to disentangle
because they interrelate on both the.emotional and
intellectual levels, and because they are constantly
changing in relationship to individual crimes. In
certain societies or for certain crimes, vengeance
predominates; while in other societies or for other
crimes, penalties are aimed more at the goal of
social control. Carlo Calisse argued that the Ren-
aissance tended to focus on the utilitarian aspect of
penalties: "Punishment [following the Middle
Ages] was conceived in a new way. The different
purposes assigned to it in the Middle Ages were
abandoned and it re-acquired a political or utili-
tarian object for the State and Society."' 5 Venice
exemplified this transition, with vengeance becom-
ing secondary to rational repression in the Early
Renaissance period.
But Calisse argued further that this transition
"' Marciana, Ms. Lat., Cl. V, 137 (10453), f.82r. This
section is entitled, "Concerning Crimes Not Specified,
the sentence will be at the discretion of the judge accord-
ing to the quality of the crime." ("De maleficiis variis et
diversis specificata, sententia sit in discretione iudicium iuxta
maleficii qualitatem.").
Calisse, A History of Italian Law reprinted in 8 THE
CONTINENTAL. LEGAL HISTORY SERIES 175 (1969).
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spawned, as part of its utilitarianism, a new em-
phasis on cruelty and terror in penalties: "The
penalty aimed both to punish the criminal and by
inspiring terror to prevent repetition and imitation.
Such a system provided very cruel penalties. There
was death made terrible in many ways: mutilation,
blinding, torture, flogging, exposing in cages, un-
speakable prisons all with a view to inspire fear."'
16
Although this might seem to be the logical result
of a desire to control crime through penalties, it
does not fit the Venetian situation. There, a
heightened rationality in the use of penalties led to
a tendency to weigh them almost as if they were
'an investment in repression, rather than an indulg-
ence in Calisse's blood bath of fear. Moderation
and restraint typified the approach of this mer-
chant-banker elite to the punishment of most
crime. Excessively severe penalties were judged to
be counterproductive.
This rationality was evident even in cases where
the state decided to raise penalties in order to deter
a particular offense. In 1359, the Major Council 17
decided that the penalty traditionally imposed for
bigamy was not large enough to deter potential
offenders ("for many frauds are committed in this
city by some who accept two wives because of the
small penalties involved") and it decided to control
this problem by increasing the severity of the sanc-
tion.s Although bigamy was a most serious crime
in the eyes of the church, the council's reaction
contained none of Calisse's cruelty. Instead, it acted
with sagacity and moderation. Realizing that the
primary motive for this crime was the profit that
male bigamists could make. in dowries, council
members attempted to remove the profit incentive
and handle the question as a business matter rather
than a moral question. The fine was increased to
16Id. Calisse was aware that Venice may have been
different as it used jail sentences for penalties; see id at
417.
7 The Major Council was the primary legislative coun-
cil of the state made up in theory of all noble males over
the age of 25, a group that probably numbered around
2,500. For any normal day's business, an average attend-
ance would have been about 500.
'8 "[Clum multe fraudes committantur in civitate ista per
nonullas accipientes duas uxores et hoc propter parva pena ...."
A.S.V., M.C., Novella, £80v (1359) and registered with
the Avogadori: Adv., MC., Reg. 24/7, f.45r (1359). The
council responsible for overseeing this provision was the
Signori di Notte. One of the primary policing agencies of
the city, it also enjoyed the right of imposing summary
justice in the streets for minor brawls and illegally carry-
ing weapons. They also prepared some unpremeditated
murder cases for trial and sex crimes that fall under the
rather loose heading of "unnatural acts" including bes-
tiality and anal intercourse with males or females.
a minimum of 100 lire, and the bigamist was
required to return the full amount of all dowries
taken.
This was not a penalty to strike fear into the
heart of bigamists. It was designed to balance the
profit potential of bigamy with the danger of fi-
nancial loss if detected. In fact, the parte made this
logic clear. The earlier penalties of the Signori di
Notte were inadequate because ("propter parva
pena") men were still willing to take the risk of
committing bigamy. To offset the attraction of this
ill-gotten gain, the fine was raised and any doubts
about the full restitution of the dowry were re-
moved.' 9
Moderate investment in repression should not
seem strange in this society of bankers and mer-
chants. A good part of their world was controlled
through investments, and it was only logical that
this technique be carried over into other areas
requiring careful control. However, when the need
was felt, the courts were still capable of violence of
the most brutal and repressive sort. The Forty
sometimes ordered public executions which were
replete with bloody mutilations and symbblic pa-
geantry.
But these moments of final justice were measured
events. There was no wholesale bloodbath. Penal-
ties were carefully guaged to the crime, to the
status of the criminal and the victim, and even to
the need for exemplary state violence at a given
time. Brutality in discrete quantities, balanced by
the certainty of punishment, seemed to be the goal
for the guardians of Venetian order. The courts
drew on a wide range of penalties for criminal
violence. Mutilation, for which there was a strong
medieval tradition, was becoming a secondary
judgment, replaced to a great extent by fines and
jail sentences. Moreover, during the fourteenth
century, jail sentences were, for technical reasons,
beginning to replace fines as well. In Venice, there
is strong evidence for arguing that for many crimes
the thirteenth century saw mutilation replaced
with fines, and that the fourteenth century saw
these fines replaced by jail sentences.
The fact that jail sentences played such an im-
portant part in Venetian penology of the -four-
teenth century is at variance with the traditional
historical view about the development of jails.
Harry Barnes, in his classic The Story of Punishment,
wrote: "The eighteenth century was the period of
transition from corporal punishment to imprison-
ment, and, though the process of change was most
rapid after 1775, there can be no doubt that the
19 Id.
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general movement was in progress during the entire
period.' ' 2° Others have argued that penal incarcer-
ation can be traced as far back as the Middle Ages.
But this was true only in England, where a unique
legal tradition made such penalties a viable alter-
native to fines and mutilation.2' Nonetheless, im-
prisonment was a normal part of Venetian criminal
punishment a full four centuries before the En-
lightenment.
The reason for the transition from fines to jail
sentences in Venice was, on the surface, rather
paradoxical in that jail sentences reduced the num-
ber of prisoners in the Venetian jails. The use of
fines as punishment had tended to cause excessive
crowding in the jails,22 because debtors were held
20 H. BARNES, Tjii- STORY OF PUNISUMFNT, A RF-t:-
ORD OF MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN 114 (2d rev. ed.
1972). Barnes claimed, moreover, that widespread use of
imprisonment did not begin until late in the eighteenth
century: "The earliest application of imprisonment as a
widespread method of dealing with criminals was carried
on not in prisons but in the prison hulks which Great
Britain legalized following 1776." Id. at 115.
21 R. Pt;H, IMPRISONMEIT IN MEDIEVAI. EN(IAN)
385 (1968). Calisse does note that there was imprisonment
practiced in Venice, but the picture he presents is some-
what confused and certainly underplays the significance
of the jail sentence in Venetian penology. He states:
With respect to life imprisonment, even the greater
penalists still looked upon it as an exceptional pun-
ishment, not conforming to the general principles of
criminal law. Clarus declared that it was not in use
as a temporal penalty except in a few places, such as
Venice, but that it was common with the Church....
Farinacius, however, declared that, if not by com-
mon law, certainly by custom, life imprisonment
had become almost general in his day, and men-
tioned, besides those of Venice, the prisons of Flor-
ence called 'Le Stinche', and those of the fortress of
Ostia and of Civita' Vecchia in the States of the
Church....
Calisse, supra note 15, at 417.
22 Communal records are full of references to this
crowding and attempts to work out schemes for removing
these people from jail especially in time of war. Examples
from the early part of the century can be found in:
1303 Adv., M.C. Reg. 20/3 f.l Ir
1307 Adv., M.C. Reg. 20/3 f.14r
1314 Adv., M.C Reg. 21/4 f.75r
1319 Adv., M.C Reg. 21/4 f.91r-v
1330 Adv., M.C. Reg. 22/5 f. 125r
1348 Adv., M.C. Reg. 23/6 f.156r
1348 Adv., M.C. Reg. 23/6 f.157r
1354 Adv., M.C. Reg. 24/7 f.26v
Primarily for those banished by the Cinque alla Pace,
this last parte also refers to those imprisoned. Both groups
were allowed to pay off on time payments their fines if
they were willing to serve in the war fleet. Apparently for
minor violence banishment was being used as well as jail.
there until they could clear their obligation. The
result was a logjam of persons in jail, lower-class
debtors, with little hope of raising the sums neces-
sary to pay their fines. One method of controlling
this problem was the gratia. A gratia was any ad-
justment to a penalty, and was generally granted
by the Major Council or the Forty with the advice
and consent of the doge, his councilors, the captains
of the Forty and whichever court imposed the
original penalty.
The granting ofagratia required the cooperation,
in theory at least, of most of the important men of
Venice.23 It might seem that this high-level coop-
eration would rule out the gratia for all but the
powerful. However, the problem caused by the
jailing of lower-class offenders who could not pay
their fines, forced this clumsy procedure to be used
as a safety valve to empty the jails. The gratia
allowed for the partial remission of fines based
upon time served, upon need or for good reputa-
tion, or, most often, by setting time payment sched-
ules, including interest to be paid to the state.
Despite its awkwardness, the gratia procedure
churned out more than 18,000 adjustments to pen-
The transition, however, in the absence of any criminal
records from the Cinque alla Pace is impossible to recon-
struct. See:
1364 Adv., MG. Reg. 24/7 f.57v
1367 Adv., M.C. Reg. 24/7 f.68v
1369 Adv., M.C Reg. 24/7 f8l r-v
Where for example "cum carceres nostri propler -onditionem el
stricturam locitantam asperitatem et horibilitatem" the Major
Council decides to seek more prison space. Most of the
schemes proposed in these pati center on either equating
certain amounts of time in jail with certain size fines or
set up general plans for paying fines on time. Whatever
the plan, it is clear that fines paradoxically were filling
the ails.A good example of this complexity is revealed by an
adjustment of the requirement for a gratia concerned with
carrying or using of weapons:
INlor may a gratia be given to anyone who incurred
any penalty from the Signori di Notte or the Capi di
Sestiere or the Cinque alle Pace [all policing bodies
with the right to give summary justice for minor
brawling and carrying weaponsl without the vote of
30 members of the Council of Forty ... nor without
the approval of the customary number of IDucall
councilors (five of six) ... nor without the approval
of five Jof sixI of the Capi di Sestiere when the
- penalty was imposed by them.
A.S.V., Adv., M.C, Reg. 21/4, f.1 12r (1320). On gratia
procedure in general, see Mor, Il procedimento per 'Gratiam'
nel diritto amministrativo veneziano del sec. XIII in CA'SIIE.RF
I)EI.IA BOI.IA I)t(Ai.E (;RAZtE NOVtUS I.IBIER
(1299-1305) in FoNTI PER IA S'tORIA It VENE:ZtA, 8EZ.
I-AR(cinvi Ptttit.lct (E. Favaro ed. 1962).
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alties between 1324 and 1406, almost all of which
were designed to clear thejails of men owing fines.2A
In light of this problem, it became simpler to put
the criminal directly in jail for a few months, as a
penalty for his crime, and avoid the problem of
leaving him there indefinitely until a gratia could
be worked out. This was especially true for mem-
bers of the lower classes, because they were less
likely to have the cash on hand to pay a fine;
whereas a noble or a person of some wealth could
pay a fine without having to spend time in jail. To
an extent, the choice between jail or fine became
a class or wealth decision, with the upper classes
being fined and the lower classes being sent to jail.
Of course, there were exceptions. Jail could be used
to make a small penalty more severe for a noble, or
a small fine could be levied against a worker. The
mixture of fines and jail sentences suggests that the
judges were giving consideration to the ability of
the criminal to pay. As a form of hidden taxation,
a fine was economically to be preferred to a jail
sentence, if the crime was not too serious and if the
court expected that the fine would be paid.
Table I shows the relative proportions of types
of penalties for rape (including attempted rape),
and for assault. Rape and attempted rape were
both relatively minor crimes, and jail sentences
were the most prevalent penalty, followed closely
24 The following registers of the Gratia were examined
for this study: A.S.V., Gratia, Reg. 3 (12 June 1329-4
Sept. 1330) with 713 cases, 98 violent; Reg. 4 (21 Aug.
1331-17 June 1332) with 666 cases, 96 violent; Reg. 5 (22
Oct. 1331-19 May 1335) most cases concerned with
property matters, only seven involved violence; this reg-
ister probably does not belong in the series; Reg. 6 (9
Sept. 1333-1 Oct. 1335) with 876 cases, 230 violent; Reg.
7 (16 Oct. 1335-12 Dec. 1338) with 1223 cases, 274
violent; Reg. 8 (15 Nov. 1338-22 Apr. 1341) with 1324
cases, 170 violent; Reg. 9 (2 Apr. 1341-18 July 1343)
with 1471 cases, 255 violent; Reg. 10 (23 July 1343-27
Nov. 1344) with 1109 cases, 205 violent; Reg. 11 (Mar.
1345-Sept. 1346) with 1391 cases, 221 violent; Reg. 12
(Apr. 1348-Aug. 1352) with 1601 cases, 237 violent; Reg.
13 (Sept. 1352-Oct. 1356) with 1085 cases, 214 violent;
Reg. 14 (Sept. 1356-1360) with 1916 cases, 334 violent;
Reg. 15 (Apr. 1361-1364) with 894 cases, 134 violent;
Reg. 16 (Apr. 1364-May 1372) too badly damaged to be
completely accurate on numbers but with 1710 readable
cases, 387 violent; Reg. 17 (Aug. 1372-Mar. 1390) with
2150 cases, 525 violent; Reg. 18 (1390-1400) in very poor
shape, only 328 cases readable of which three are identi-
fiable as violent; Reg. 19 (19 Mar. 1401-10 Jan. 1405-06)
there is only one violent case reported in this register
again indicating that it probably does not belong in the
series. Registers 3 through 18 covering the period 1329 to
1400 then report 18,457 gratie that are still legible of
which 3,383 cases involve violent crime.
Table : Types of Penalties for Rape and Assault, 1324-1406
Jail Foe Baniehoent Corporal Total-
1% I% # % # %
Rape 305 51 242 41 24
Assault 301 40 373 49 51
4 25 4
7 31 4
*2e total is smaler than the nuzber of penalties because
penalties were often combined.
by fines. Banishment and corporal punishment
were relatively rare. For assault, there was a similar
emphasis placed on fines and jail sentences, al-
though fines predominated.
There were very few penalties involving corporal
or capital punishment. We can divide these types
of punishment into four categories of ascending
brutality: discipline (whipping or minor torture);
mutilation; execution; and mutilation plus execu-
tion. The types of corporal punishment used for
the crimes of rape and assault were very restrained.
For assault, out of 569 cases heard by the Forty,
only fifteen involved mutilation of the criminal;
and sixteen more involved some form of corporal
discipline. For rape offenses, corporal punishment
was even less significant, with twenty cases of
discipline and only four of mutilation. The brutal
penalties that, for Calisse, were designed to intim-
idate, did not exist for minor violent crimes like
rape, nor even for more serious crimes like assault.
The state evidently preferred a more flexible scale
of penalties, which could be tailored to the court's
perception of the crime and its social context.
The differences between penalties assigned to
nobles and workers is instructive for understanding
the economic and social distinctions involved in
social control.25 In rape cases, among the eighty-
four nobles successfully prosecuted thirty-seven re-
ceived fines (44%); fourteen received jail sentences
(17%); and thirty-three received a combination of
both jail sentences and fines (39%). Workers, in
173 rape cases, received fines in only twenty-four
cases (14%); jail sentences in eighty-nine cases
(51%); and a combination ofjail sentence and fine
in sixty cases (35%). The role of fines and jail
sentences was reversed for the two classes, with jail
sentences predominating for workers, who were less
2 The distinction between workers and nobles is a
simple one between those who are listed in the records as
nobles and those who are listed in the records as having
a specific type of work. This leaves a considerable number
of cases unidentified but still provides a basis for com-
paring distinctions in the type of penalties in the clearest
of possible contrasts.
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able to pay fines. Both classes had a high level of
mixed penalties, but for rather different reasons.
For workers, the mixed penalty was a means of
taxing whatever wealth the criminal had available,
and at the same time reducing the amount of time
the criminal would take -ap space in jail. For nobles,
the mixed penalty was designed to add severity to
the usual fine. In a mixed penalty the bite of the
law was felt more sternly, because time in jail
weighed equally upon all. Noble jail sentences were
relatively short, and were reserved for the most
serious crimes. Only eight noble rape cases involved
a term in jail of more than a year, and a majority
of cases involved less than half a year.
"26
A significant example of the type of noble rape
heinous enough in the eyes of the Forty to warrant
a jail sentence involved the noble Nicoleto Georgio
and an eight year old girl named Elena. Typical of
noble economic power Nicoleto did not even carry
off the girl himself. Rather he hired a certain
Blanca of questionable reputation who kidnapped
the victim, provided a room for the crime and
actually helped in the rape itself. Nicoleto was
sentenced-to a half year in jail and a fine of 500
lire. The fine he paid immediately, but the half
year'in jail presumably took him a half year and
made the matter considerably more serious than
the normal fine for a rape. Blanca, on the other
hand, with apparently less money available re-
ceived a penalty more typical of the Forty's severity
applied to the lower classes. She was whipped and
branded, had her guilt publicly proclaimed at the
Rialto Bridge, spent three months in jail and was
perpetually banned from Venice.2 ' Though strict
penalties for rape were rare, this case underlines
the point presented by the statistics. A significant
social selectivity was used in the imposition of
penalties for crimes of violence.
Assault cases heard by the Forty revealed a
similar breakdown. The contrast between the social
classes is less striking because these cases involved
a wider range of penalties than did rape cases. Yet
the distinction remains strong. Nobles in 121 cases
2'3This included both cases where jail was the sole
penalty, and where jail was used in conjunction with
fines. or a total of 46 cases.
27This case is also interesting because the victim.
Elena, rather atypically, received a portion of the fine as
a contribution It her dowry. Eight years later when she
married at 16 she received from the state a handsome
dowTry of 99 gold duicats. the return on an investment of
half the fine paid by Nicoleto. A.S.V.. Adv.. Raspe. Reg.
2. f.204v (1353). For a brief discussion of sex crine iin
Venice in this period see, Ruggiero. 5.aual Grimnalitr ill
the Early Reinaisoancc: einice 1338- 1358. 8J. Sx:. lIhsr. 18
(1975).
Table 1i- Types of Penalties for Murder
Percentage Corrected
Sumber Percentage for Unreported
Jail 42 10 13
Fine 18 4 6
Banlshment 39 9 12
Corporal and Capital 220 52 69
Totals 319 - 500
*There were a total of 427 case.. but in 155 cases the
Signori di Notte did not report penalties inposed. The nun-
her of penalties listed above remains larger than the number
of convictions because sone penalties were mixed.
Table Ini: A Breakdown of Corporal and Capital Punishment
for Murder
Percentage Corpor- Percentage 015





received fines eighty-three times (69%), jail sen-
tences twenty times (17%), and mixed sentences
eighteen times (15%). For workers in 195 cases.
fifty-five received fines (29%), sixty-nine received
jail sentences (35%), and seventy received mixed
sentences (36%). In both areas of crime the message
was clear: workers received jail sentences and no-
bles received fines. The state could not use fines
efficiently as penalties for the lower classes because
their inability to pay created more problems than
was warranted by the revenue to be gained. Nat-
urally, there was also a considerable amount of
class favoritism involved, but this fact of social life
can be balanced against the perennial problem of
crowded jails. In this context, the profit from fines,
when they could be collected, argued for such
penalties. especially for minor crimes like rape.
For major crimes-murder and robbery-
V'enetian practice came closer to Calisse's general-
ization. Tables II and III show that the great
majority of murder cases involved corporal or cap-
ital punishment, most often execution. "- Yet, there
were still significant variations within the cate-
gories. The Venetian controllers created distinc-
tions in the manner or nature of the penalties, to
fit their varying perceptions of the situation.
The most significant distinction made in capiial
punishment was between simple executions and
20 That is 145 cases out of 272 cases where penalties
were recorded involved the execution of the culprit. In
155 cases there is no record of the penalties imposed,
because the Signori di Notte failed to record the penalty




the more elaborate, ritual executions that included
public mutilation. The latter were moments rich
in the symbolism of state control. A typical exam-
ple resulted from the murder of Richa di Tarvisio
by her husband, Giovanni. Giovanni's crime was
not the passionate outcome of a family quarrel, as
were so many murders of this sort; rather, it was a
planned and coldblooded act, by contemporary
standards. One night after everyone was asleep, he
carried his wife from bed, dumped her in a canal,
and watched her drown while she cried for mercy.
His reason for the crime was that he wanted to
leave his wife in order to live with his mistress, but
his wife had refused because of their children.
Giovanni decided to murder her in order to remove
this obstacle to his desires.
The Forty chose a penalty for Giovanni that
expressed the nobility's antipathy to such heartless
deeds. It was ordered that Giovanni be taken by
boat to the far end of Venice and then returned to
the place where the crime was committed, on the
island of Giudecca, with his crime being pro-
claimed all the while by a state herald. There, at
the place of the crime, his right hand was to be cut
off and hung around his neck with a
chain-symbolizing the literal removal of the of-
fending member. At the same time, his guilt was
to be proclaimed continually to the gathered
crowd. With his severed hand hanging around his
neck and the herald continuing his proclamation,
Giovanni was next to be taken to St. Mark's
Square, where, between the columns of justice, he
was to be solemnly hanged. This public ritual was
designed to free society of its shared guilt, to bring
public vengeance to the malefactor and to reaffirm
one of the most basic meanings of the state-that
it would protect its members from criminal vio-
lence.2
Aspects of this public execution had particular
significance. The trip across Venice assured that a
maximum audience would participate in the cere-
mony. Historians have speculated about the men-
tality of the crowds which witnessed executions,
citing such factors as collective blood-lust, or the
existence of a mob mentality that sanctions nor-
mally unacceptable types of brutality. But these
interpretations neglect a more important factor,
which is the ritual nature of the execution. Success-
ful ritual takes human emotions and redirects them
toward some acceptable goal, permitting even the
bloodiest ritual, when commonly shared, to become
a transcendent experience. The pagan Taurobolium
(a purification rite in which the blood of a bull was
2 A.S.V., Adv., Raspe, Reg. 2, f.314r-v (1360).
used to wash away sin usually associated in classical
Rome with the worship of the goddess Cybele) and
the Eucharistic ceremony are replete with blood,
even the blood of God,. but the ritual context
transcends the brutality of the symbolism. A simi-
lar transcendence occurs in highly stylized, ritu-
alistic state ceremonies.
When the state is acting as a church, what could
be more effective than ritual executions which, in
their brutality, reinforce the basic tenet of that
religion that Venice is a stable society and will
provide order and security? Just as the blood and
body of the resurrected son of God convey the
reality of human salvation to those who believe, so
too, the ritual mutilation and execution convey, in
a graphic way, the basic promise of stability to the
state.
The abundant details in Jacobo Bertaldo's con-
temporary account of the ideal Venetian procession
also showed this sacred character of state justice.
fhe doge was to present himself to the people
("popolo") as the representative of state custom and
usage ("consuetudinem atque usum") in order to teach
the people to shun evil and strive for the good. To
do this, he first displayed the majesty of the ducal
office by the rich and splended clothing which he
wore, demonstrating the rewards ofjust living. On
his right he displayed the judge as the representa-
tive of his full power ("merun imperium") to judge
criminals. Seeing the judge at the right hand of the
doge, Bertaldo claimed, would once more teach the
people to avoid evil because of the fear of being
themselves judged ("terrore iudicii iudicum
spaventati"). Also, the doge displayed his sword
("spata domini ducis") which was carried immedi-
ately behind him, to remind the people of his
avenging power ("vindicta potencia").30
30 Bertaldo was Venetian chancellor at the turn of the
fourteenth century and included this description in his
panegyric to Venetian political perfection. See SPLENDOR
VENETORUM CivrrATIs CONSUETUDINEM 12-13 (F.
Schupfer ed. 1901). This text which I have paraphrased
above is extremely significant and reads like an expla-
nation of the significance of the religious ritual, which to
a great extent it is:
Primo enim ostenditur mayestas glorie ducalis in apparatu et
ornamento precioso et splendido sue persone, ut doceantur boni
de splendor gracie, per suam bonitaten largiter remunerari et
iusta desideria obtinere. Secundo, ostenditur iudex in dextra
iudicandi malefactores, ut iudice viso, ipsi doceantur decinare
a malo et sibi cavere de faciendo maion, terrore iudici
spaventati. Tercio ostenditur ensis sive spata domini ducis,
que post eum aportatur, ut doccantur de vindicta potencia et
fortitudinis ducalis ad penas iudicantis incisione memborum
graviter infligendas. Et debet post dominem ducem cnsis sire
spata portari, quia vindicta malefactorun post iudicumfieri
debet. Et nota, quod ubicumque spata portatur in publido,
iudex in dextra debet interesse....
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Ritual execution, however, was used with re-
straint, being reserved only for those serious crimes
where there was general accord with the goals of
the state. In times of doubt, such as conspiracies
against the government, where there was some
question about the sympathies of the people, exe-
cutions were carried out quietly. In 1355, for ex-
ample, when the doge was accused of fomenting a
conspiracy to overthrow the nobility and establish
himself as a popularly supported despot, he was
quietly and efficiently dispatched in private. In
such cases there was perhaps a lesson, but no ritual.
This-was true of most treason cases handled by the
Council of Ten, a secret police force primarily
concerned with political crime.31 They preferred
silence and efficiency to public lessons. Ritual was
saved for moments of public consensus.
When these public mutilations and executions
are perceived in ritual terms, we need no longer
view the public as a bloodthirsty mob. No one
would argue that the Roman Catholic Church is
particularly bloodthirsty because of the Eucharistic
ceremony. The difference in both cases is the trans-
ferral that is made by the believing spectator or
participant. The ritual heightens and transfers the
emotions that are normally associated with death.
Murder becomes purification. If the ceremony is
successful, one witnesses not cruelty but the
triumph ofjustice. In societies less attuned to ritual,
like our own, these connections are, for the most
part, lost. How many people would identify with
the ritual significance of an execution, and how
many would identify with the immediate fact that
a person was being killed?ss In Early Renaissance
3' The Council of Ten was created in 1310 to deal with
the danger-laden social tensions following the unsuccess-
ful Querini-Tiepolo conspiracy. It continued, however, to
meet as a virtually unrestricted secret committee con-
cerned with state security and gained progressively in
power, status and reputation for acting ruthlessly. Pros-
ecutions were'mainly concerned with speech crimes, ille-
gal associations and conspiracy and were handled almost
exclusively within the council. Membership was generally
drawn from the most powerful families in Venice. Social
clout, nebulous responsibility, and an extremely fluid
style of operation made the Ten a very potent organiza-
tion and one essentially beyond legal restraint. On the
Ten's growth to power see, G. Ruggiero, The Ten: Con-
trol of Violence and Social Disorder in Trecento Venice
134-265 (1972) (unpublished doctoral dissertation in the
University of'California at Los Angeles Library). For the
execution of the Doge Marino Faliero in 1355 the work
of Vittorio Lazzarini is still basic. Ste V. LAZZARINI,
MARINO FALIERO (1963).
3 In line with this same analysis, the trend towards
more and more emotionless executions that fits so well
with liberal penology, by removing what little ritual there
society, much more attuned to ritual and pagean-
try, the transferral was natural. Many onlookers
must have seen the triumph of state order more
vividly than the death.
This argument bears ultimately on the question
of how cruel the men and women of the Renais-
sance were. It is frequently assumed that the ac-
ceptance of brutal spectacles is proof that members
of that society were inured to bloodshed, suffering,
and death. But this is not necessarily the case.
Ritual violence loses much of its negative character
when participants believe in the ritual. It would be
unwise to conclude that Early Renaissance man
was habituated to violence because he was able to
accept such ritual, just as it is an error to contend
that Catholics accept cannibalism because they
regularly eat the blood and body of a god-man.
The violence of the state, in Venetian executions,
was transformed into a'religion of state.
In Venice, capital punishment was reserved for
the most serious crimes such as murder, robbery
and the infrequently prosecuted crimes of counter-
feiting and homosexuality. Most other crimes were
punished with jail or fines. In contrast with Cal-
isse's view, cruelty was not seen as an effective
deterrent. More measured penalties were preferred,
suggesting that the Venetian nobility was quite
careful in meting out the amount and types of
repression needed to control crime.
If ritual executions tended to emphasize the
religious and the symbolic side of social control,
jail sentences and fines tended to emphasize the
rational and schematic side. This has already be-
come apparent from the discussion of patterns of
use for each penalty, and the relation to social
position. These patterns provide the fullest illustra-
tion of the rational use of penalties to control
was left in such ceremonies, made it even more difficult
to live with capital punishment. This, of course, is not to
suggest a return to Venetian style show executions; in
fact if anything the opposite seems to be the conclusion
to be drawn. In a society where the state is no longer
involved theoretically in winning the support of its citi-
zenry through the rituals of state, but rather through the
rational consent of the governed, such rituals no longer
have much meaning and what in another social situation
was justice, without the context of ritual, seems more and
more like murder. It is not strange to find, therefore, that
often those who support the use of capital punishment
are those who visualize government as something to
"believe in," as a type of latter day faith, or those less
sincere who wish to convey that impression. Executions
in the context of a state religion that promises a type of
divine justice on earth are much more easily accepted
than rational executions to rid the state of a problem or
as acts of vengeance.
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crimeam When fines and jail sentences are consid-
ered together, it is clear that there was a definite
tendency to use moderate or even light penalties
for all but the most serious of crimes.
The problem arises of finding a scale by which
we may compare jail sentences and fines, because
these are obviously very different types of penalties.
Fortunately, there are contemporary records of
equivalencies that the courts of Venice themselves
saw between fines and jail sentences. In its simplest
form, this equivalency may be expressed as "one
year in jail equals 200 lire piccole" (the lire piccola
was pegged to the small coinage of everyday use
and the primary currency in which fines were
assessed.)5 4 But to avoid confusion and an appear-
ance of absolute equivalency, rather than convert-
ing fines to jail time or visa-versa, a neutral point
scale for penalties is perhaps most useful. It keeps
to the fore the reality that we are using an artificial
scale of comparison, based to be sure upon equi-
a This distinction between rational manipulation of
penalties and ritualistic use of penalties should perhaps
be clarified a bit. Essentially the rational penalty is a
calculated force designed to counterbalance violence.
Ritual executions certainly have this element also, but
what sets them apart is that they operate on another
plane as well. Basically they teach not by means of proof
but by means of the emotions elicited by ritual. Thus one
learns about God by studying theology, which is a ra-
tional approach to understanding; one may also however
experience God through the ritual of a religion, which is
a basically non-rational approach to awareness. In the
same way one may learn about the meaning of a govern-
ment in any number of rational ways, but one may also
experience some aspects of the state through its ritual. In
the renaissance state for all its rationality of organization,
the latter aspects of ritual were still extremely important.
a4 This equivalency is based upon the actual penalties
imposed when judges gave a criminal a choice between
a fine or ajail sentence. Rough but remarkably consistent,
this equivalency in 50 cases, where an option was given,
finds a deviation between total points for jail sentences
and fines of less than five percent from the perfect balance
that would be expected if the judges were being scientif-
ically consistent in their equation of jail sentences and
fines. This is amazingly consistent when one realizes we
are considering a period of more than eight decades and
our judges were often little more than amateurs. In 15
cases, generally the major ones, the equivalency is exact:
A.S.V., Adv., Raspe, Reg. 1, f.168v, 173r, 175v, 175v, 181r
(one year equals X 200p.), 202v (six months equals £
100p.), 203r-203v (one year equals X 2 0 0 p.); Reg. 2, f.78r
(six months equals X loop.), 84v (one year equals £
200p.), 105r (six months equals £ 100p.), 106v (three
months equals £ 50p.), 145r (six months equals X 100p.),
164r (three months equals X 50p.), 164r (three months
equals £ 50p.). On the whole then for an equivalency
based upon contemporary perceptions, the equation of a
one yearjail sentence with £ 2 0 0 p is remarkably consist-
ent.
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valencies established in the Venetian documents of
criminal penalties, but still artificial. If we equate
ten lire piccole with one point (ten lire piccole is about
the minimum fine), then one year in jail would
equal twenty points. Though other monies besides
the lira piccola were in use in Venice, the lire piccola
was by far the most prevalent currency for fines,
and those few fines in other currencies can be
pegged to the lira piccola by using contemporary
exchange rates.35 The result is a point scale that
allows comparison of penalties for most violent
crimes, because virtually all penalties were either
fines, jail sentences, or a combination of the two.
With this point scale, we have a convenient
mechanism in Graph I for comparing fines and jail
sentences for particular crimes. For all but the most
serious violent crimes, penalties tended to be either
very mild or very severe, reflecting what seems to
have been a purely rational application of state
power. This is reflected graphically by a typical
reverse J-curve. Fines and jail sentences were kept
minimal, in order to limit the crowding in jails
while still guaranteeing penalties for all offenders.
Occasionally, however, the judges reacted very
strictly to a crime. The vast majority of penalties
cluster at the bottom end of the point scale; then
there is a wide range of penalty possibilities that
are little used, followed by a much smaller group-
ing of very severe penalties. This pattern holds for
most crimes of violence except the most serious
3 This conversion of values can become extremely
complex. Nicolo Popodopoli outlined the major conver-
sion rates for the period 1345-53. On the basis of his
figures X 10p equals 3.12 ducats, and
X 10p equals 12.3 lire a grossi a moneta
£ 10p equals .3 lire di grossi a moneta
" 10p equals .3 lire di grossi a oro
X 10 p equals 12.3 lire a grossi a oro.
Rather than attempting to plot continuously the fluc-
tuating rates between these currencies, which are not
really adequately worked out, it was decided to stick with
these ratios for the period under consideration. This
decision was made somewhat easier by the fact that fines
become more and more standardized in lira piccola as the
century progresses. A decade by decade breakdown shows
this pattern: 1320s-9 fines in other currencies;
1330s-12; 1340s- 11; 1350s-22; 1360s-12;
1370s- 11; 1380s-1; 1390s-1. In fact most penalties in
other monies cluster around the period presented by
Papodopoli. It should be noted as well that these 78 fines
in other currencies are a very small part of the total
statistical picture, actually approximately 90% of all fines
imposed in this period for speech, assault, rape and
murder were in lira piccola. As £ 10p equals one point,
each unit in the above scale is worth one point. See N.
PAPODOPOLI, SUL VALORE DELLA MONErA VENEZIANA
LE-7'O NELL' ADUNANZA DEL R. IsTI'rUTO DI SCIENZE,
Li I-ERE ED ARI DI VENEZIA 17 (1885).
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noted earlier, where the penalty was usually death
or major mutilation. This is evidence of a common
approach to the punishment of crimes of violence.
It reflects a rational, almost technical, response to
the problem Venetian society faced in using these
types of penalties-that of overcrowded jails.3 6 To
clear the jails, yet consistently penalize the crimi-
nals, the state was forced to tailor fines to the
criminals' ability to pay, within the context of the
seriousness of the crime and the need to keep jail
sentences to a minimum. Fines that were too high
meant jail time, often considerable given the travail
of the gratia procedure discussed earlier, just as
surely as regularly imposed jail sentences. Moder-
ation was the only answer, short of returning to
wholesale mutilations or banishments. The latter
alternative was unlikely in a city with a labor-
hungry merchant marine and nascent industrial
development.
36 This problem was compounded by the fact that
unlike most later uses of jails in the pre-modern period,
Venice paid for the jails and the jailors out of state
revenues. See A.S.V., Adv., M.C., Reg.21/4, f.148r and
Reg.22/5, f.45v both of which refer to adjustments in
state paid salaries tojailors.
Graph I presents an overview of the phenome-
non. The penalties for 1,100 prosecutions fall, in a
majority of cases (56%), in the minimal ranges of
up to ten points: 100 lire picccole or six months in
jail. By the time penalties reach thirty points,
eighty-four percent of all fines, jail sentences, or
combinations of the two are included. Yet a mean-
ingful proportion of the remainder falls at the far
right of the scale, at or beyond 100 points (44% cf
the remainder of 8% of the total). Most penalties
involved six months or less in jail, or an equivalent
fine; but in a small but significant number of cases
(eighty-two out of 1,100), the penalties were very
stiff, demanding five or more years in jail or its
equivalent.
This balance between the moderate and the
severe is seen more clearly if we check the variation
from the average penalty curve presented in Graph
I for each crime. Table IV reveals that for major
assault, attempted rape, rape and speech crimes
there is surprisingly little variation from the aver-
age indicating that aside from diversity in the very
light categories penalties for each crime fall into a
very similar pattern. Assault, even when divided
into major and minor, tends to follow this same
[Vol. 69
RENAISSANCE VENICE



























pattern, with a significant deviation only in the
one to five and 100+ point range. Thus the minor
assault curve would start at a higher point than
the other crimes, reflecting a higher percentage of
lower penalties and would push the reverseJ-curve
to the left. We find a sizable group of penalties
(6%, or sixteen out of 281) requiring at least two
years in jail or 400 lire piccole, (forty points or more).
Major assault would merely move this pattern to
the right, with a greater emphasis on strict penal-
ties. Still, more than half of the cases are included
in the five to twenty point range (58%), meaning
that in most cases jail sentences were not longer
than a year. At the severe end of the scale, however,
the seriousness of the crime required a somewhat
greater concentration of penalties with approxi-
mately fifteen percent of those convicted receiving
penalties of 100 points or more.
Despite the similarities, it is clear from this di-
vision between major and minor assault that we
are dealing with two different crimes, even though
we could search the mass of data for examples of
matching penalties. This points up the need for
doing statistical analysis for the pre-modern period,
because even when the statistics are imperfect they
prescribe important limits for the historical imagi-
nation. Major and minor assaults were quite dif-
ferent crimes, even though there was a significant
overlap in penalties at the lower end of the scale.
Another lesson that these data reveal is the danger
in using the mean as a normative indicator for
crimes that follow a reverse J-curve. A look at
Table IV reveals just how atypical a figure the
mean can be. Indeed, only five percent of all
penalties imposed for major assault fall on the
mean point. Almost three-fourths (74%) of all cases
fall below the mean. The primary lesson remains,
however, that penalties were remarkably restrained
for both major and minor assaults.
Rape penalties also deviate very little from the
average. Moreover there is very little difference
between attempted rape and successful rape, both
the means and the deviations being relatively sim-
ilar. For both, a majority of cases (55% for at-
tempted rape, 52% for rape) are within the first ten
points of the scale, and the bulk of all penalties
Penalty Average Variation Variation
Points % Minor Major
Assault Assault
GUIDO RUGGIERO
(87% for attempted rape, 80% for rape) are within
the first thirty points. It is evident that both rape
and attempted rape were considered to be minor
crimes to an equal degree. The hook on the reverse
J would be found here as well, with nine percent
and five percent of the penalties falling on or
beyond the 100 point mark. Once more, the courts
were punishing culprits either very mildly or, oc-
casionally, very strictly, but not making much
distinction between the attempted crime and the
successful one.
Each of the crimes we have discussed so far had
its penalties imposed by the Forty, but the pattern
continued even into crimes 6f speech which were
the responsibility of the Council of Ten, thus
strengthening the interpretation that this was a
general pattern in Venice for crimes other than
murder and robbery. As Table IV shows, the ma-
jority of speech cases (69%) are included in the one
to ten point range; and a full eighty-five percent of
the penalties fall within the first thirty point range.
The right hook of the reverse J would be sharply
present, placing eleven percent of the total on or
beyond the 100 point mark. For speech, and for all
the other crimes discussed, time in jail was mini-
mized. Even the Ten used severe penalties only in
unusual cases.
Although Carlo Calisse believed that the "ra-
tionalized" approach to crime control in the Ren-
aissance meant stiff and often bloody penalties, in
Venice this generalization is not supported by data
for typical violent crimes. The reason for this in the
broad perspective was that the Venetians had more
to consider than striking fear into the hearts of
potential criminals. For serious crimes like robbery
and murder, the state could be punitive in both a
bloody and symbolic way. But for other crimes,
technical considerations kept the response at a
milder level than the Calisse theory would suppose.
The continued need for labor, plus a desire to keep
the incarcerated population from becoming un-
mangeably large and costly, meant that payable
fines and short jail sentences, were the normal
penalties for violence in Venice. These penalties,
sure but not destructive, were the most rational of
all. The bureaucratic state that was Venice oper-
ated by that logic, but also did not neglect the state
as church, as the recurring sharp right hook of the
reverse J-curve demonstrates. State as church and
state as bureaucracy combined effectively in the
penalty process. The law, rather than limiting the
judges, freed the judges to match punishment with
crime in a manner responsive to the nuances of
societal need.
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